Division of Labour and Social Coordination Modes. A simple simulation model by Massimo Egidi & Luigi Marengo
Division of Labour and Social Coordination
Modes
A simple simulation model
1










This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the relationship
between the process of functional division of labour and the modes in which
activities and plans are coordinated. We consider a very simple production process:
a given heap of bank-notes has to be counted by a group of accountants. Because of
limited individual capabilities and/or the possibilities of mistakes and external
disturbances, the task has to be divided among several accountants and a
hierarchical coordination problem arises.
We can imagine several different ways of socially implementing
coordination of devided tasks. 1) a central planner can compute the optimal
architecture of the system; 2) a central planner can promote quantity adjustments by
moving accountants from hierarchical levels where there exist idle resources to
levels where resources are insufficient; 3) quasi-market mechanisms can use
quantity or price signals for promoting decentralized adjustments. By means of a
simple simulation model, based on Genetic Algorithms and Classifiers Systems, we
can study the dynamic efficiency properties of each coordination mode and in
particular their capability, speed and cost of adaptation to changing environmental
situations (i.e. variations of the size of the task and/or variations of agents'
capabilities). Such interesting issues as returns to scale, specialization and workers
exploitation can be easily studied in the same model.
".... I still believe that, by what is implicit in its reasoning, economics has
come nearer than any other social science to an answer to that central question of all
social sciences: How can the combinations of fragments of knowledge existing in
different minds bring about results which, if they were to be brought about
deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind which no
single person can possess? To show that in this sense the spontaneous actions of
individuals will, under conditions which we can define, bring about a distribution of
resources which can be understood as if it were made according to a single plan,
although nobody has planned it, seems to me an answer to the problems which has
sometimes been metaphorically described as that of the "social mind".
                                                
1 Paper presented at the Second International Symposium "Simulating Societies '93", Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, July 24-
26, 1993. in N. Gilbert (Editor) Simulating Societies, UCL Press.2
(Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, in Individualism and Economic Order ;
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 54)
1 - Introduction.
Division of labour and coordination.
It is customary to consider economic organizations as social systems which make
coordination of individual plans and decisions possible. Little attention has been instead given
to the connection between forms of coordination and a dynamic process which has been
characterizing industrial societies: the process of increasing division of labour.
The fact that the two processes have been somewhat connected in their historical
development is hardly questionable: as economic organizations increased the degree of
division of labour and knowledge, the problem of coordination between a rising number of
increasingly inter-related producers and decision makers became more and more complex.
Coordination of distributed decisions by markets, firms and other economic institutions
appears as the other side of the process of division of labour.
The historical evidence still does not clearly show whether the two processes have co-
evolved as two aspects of the same phenomenon or have mainly proceeded independently, in
terms of both temporal and causal relationships (cf. Polanyi 1958), but some evidence at the
microeconomic level - such as analyses of the processes of design and managerial planning in
modern corporations - seem to support the hypothesis of co-evolution. In economic
organizations in which planning and design are highly purposeful activities, division of labour
and coordination are the joint result of these very activities. But can the hypothesis of co-
evolution of coordination and division of labour be extended also to the cases in which - both
in markets and in organizations - they are not the outcome of a purposeful planning and
design process, but are emergent and partly unintended properties of the interaction between
distributed decision-making activities (cf. Hayek 1948)?
Behind this question lie two different ways of conceiving the division of labour:
1) as the outcome of a single mind, which designs, devides and coordinates: this is the
view behind the Marxian capitalist and the Schumpeterian entrepreneur;
2) as the emergent, unplanned and unconscious outcome of the interaction of local and
incomplete decisions.
We believe that an intermediate form can be found in real large business organizations,
where both the two forms, top-down conscious design and bottom-up decisions whose
outcomes are partially unintended, co-exist in a mixed and complex way. To understand why
this is so we have firstly to take into considerations the role played within them by routines
and contracts; both routines and contract are necessarily incomplete and partly tacit, and this
implies that noticeable discretionary margin must be left to the actors and incompleteness and
tacitness bring about cognitive conflicts.
To be persuaded, suppose that the top management puts into place a re-design of the
organization in order to react to some kind of environmental change. The implementation of
the new division of labour within the organization which is required by such a change gives
rise to a complex process of adaptation which is far from what believed by the traditional
theory of planning: from one hand in fact the implementation of a new organizational design
requires managers and employees to re-think their jobs and revise their competences; from the
other, to be effective, any new design requires local checks and readjustments, i.e. the
resolution of cognitive conflicts arising from the match among the general requirements of the
project and the specific, idiosincratic knowledge arising from the personal knowledge of any
single agent.3
This require to briefly discuss the role of managers: for what has been said, we cannot
clearly separate managing by doing:
"... the blue collar worker on the most routinized assembly line must
repeatedly make decisions about how to handle nonstandard situations, and in
particular when to call one to the attention of the supervisor. On the other hand,
sales managers, in addition to managing their salespersons, often spend considerable
amounts of time with clients, engaged in selling, and thus in "doing"" (Radner
1992).
"Doing", i.e. the application of a given routine, is never a mere execution of given rules
but always involves some discretionary behaviour, if anything because a fully specified
routine, which does not leave any space for autonomous decision-making, would require an
endless list of contingent behaviours. The essence of managerial activities seems rather to lie
in the capability to fill knowledge and information gaps and in the capability to design the
organization of labour and "imagine how to do".
Therefore top-down plans - which are necessarily incomplete for reasons we will
discuss below - have to match pieces of knowledge and skills which are largely local and tacit
and therefore they inevitably have a largely uncertain and unintended outcome.
Before discussing the reasons of the incompleteness of planning, it is useful to note that,
when considered in its connections with the process of division of labour, the very notion of
coordination takes a different meaning from the one implicit in neoclassical economics. For
the latter coordination means making individual and independent decisions compatible: here
instead the problem of coordination concerns the relationship between the top-down activity
to design new organizational set-ups and the adaptive, intelligent bottom-up reactions by
managers and employees, which should give rise to a better adaptation of the organization to
the external environment.
Division of labour, distributed knowledge and specialization.
The analysis of the process of division of labour as a primary determinant in economic
development, goes back to Adam Smith and lies at the heart of classical economics. But little
of these early analytical efforts have been continued in modern neoclassical economics, and
have been brought back to their central role only within recent non-neoclassical studies of the
process of technological evolution (cf., for instance, Dosi et al. 1988).
A possibly fruitful way of interpreting the process of division of labour is to consider it
within the general framework of the theory of problem-solving. From this point of view, the
division of labour can be interpreted as a process of decomposition of problems into sub-
problems to be solved independently. Direct observation of the behaviour of organizations and
individuals as problem-solving activity - within the tradition initiated by March and Simon -
suggests that such behaviour is a peculiar and unstable balance between two opposite
situations: on one side purely routinized behaviour, in which a series of operations are
repeated again and again, on the other side an active and conscious search for solutions to new
problems or new solutions to old problems faced by the organization.
Without entering the vast debate on how to formally represent problem-solving
activities, some general points are worth mentioning for their relevance to the subject of this
paper.
First, problem solving activity is characterized by a search in the space of problems,
which generally leads to the decomposition of the original problems into at least partially
independent sub-problems. If such a decomposition is feasible, sub-problems can be solved in
a parallel way and subsequently coordinated: the original problem is therefore decomposed
into a set of connected sub-problems. In the language of economics and organization science,4
this corresponds to the expectation that the decomposition of a production process (lato sensu)
into independent sub-systems, which can be dealt with in relative isolation and in parallel, will
lead to increasing returns, in spite of the coordination costs which the decomposition brings
about.
Second, the working hypothesis we propose - along the lines of Simon and March - is
that the search in the problem space, based on the division of the given problem into sub-
problems, is a model for the division of knowledge; even if division of knowledge and
division of labour are not the same process (two employees cooperating in the same
organization can have the same competences and largely overlapped knowledge but divided
and different jobs) the former is necessary to the latter.
Third, it must be emphasised that the search in the space of sub-problems is a highly
uncertain and conjectural process. In fact, when a problem is decomposed into a set of sub-
problem, generally not all the sub-problems will be immediately solvable and consequently
they will be in turn decomposed into simpler ones. The decomposition then recursively
proceeds until all the relevant sub-problems have been solved. The procedure by
decomposition is therefore a conjectural one for the two following reasons:
a) there is no set of decomposition rules which a priori allows agents to achieve a
certain result;
b) subjects can verify the solvability of the original problem only when all the relevant
sub-problems have been solved (cf. Egidi 1992).
This implies that plans and projects within firms are not merely executed by different
subjects but they necessarily require a multi-agent process of learning and adaptation which
can involve cognitive conflicts among the different actors.
These feautures allow us to consider coordination within organizations as the
complementary part of the division of knowledge and labour which follows the realization of
a new project; the further the division of labour proceeds, the more the different divided parts
require coordination and the more information becomes dispersed. A crucial problem then
arises: can we assume that the coevolution of division of labour and coordination take place
also within markets?
A first approach (cf. Coase 1937) would claim that markets coordinate only (by means
of price mechanisms) whereas the division of labour is entirely performed within
organization. A more careful examination would suggest that the two processes take place in a
complementary way in both the organizational set-ups, market and business organization, the
main difference being the degree of awareness which characterizes the actors of the process.
The context of shumpeterian competition is a good starting point to clarify how division
of labour and cordination can take place in the market: suppose that a cluster of product
innovations arise in the economic system. If the new products substitute old intermediate
goods, they will activate the modification of the routines involved and a "second generation"
of adaptive innovators will arise: they in turn, by using the new products will produce either
new goods or the old ones in a new manner. In the first case, a dynamic innovation process
arises, in which new projects lead to the modification of other projects. It must be noticed
that, it is not merely a matter of spreading of an innovation. On the contrary, what we are
describing is an "avalanche" of innovations which are activated recursively by the original
cluster of innovations. As a consequence of the original innovative actions two different
"responses" of the system could occur. The first, without altering the basic structure of the
division of labour, gives rise to local dynamic processes. In other cases, - often going beyond
the intentions and the expectations of the innovators - the reaction of the system causes a new
definition of division of labour, knowledge and competences within the economic system.5
This clarifies how a new division of labour and knowledge can take place within
markets. Moreover, it bring us to a crucial point: the coordination process by market strongly
involves the transmission of knowledge and competences: prices does not convey sufficient
information to support coordination processes which follow a division of labour.
This importance of this point and the provisional conclusion we have reached are
reinforced if we consider an intermediate organizational set-up, as does Williamson in his
"fundamental transformation". When two or more contracting parts (business enterprises)
engage into a new common project, this normally will require an improvement in human and
physical assets internal to each enterprise, and a transfer of knowledge among the enterprises.
The emergence of sunk costs in phisical and human capital guarantees the strength of the links
among the parts. Even in this case, the relationship among firms which takes place in the
market will involve not only price signals but also (and fundamentally!) the transmission of
pieces of knowledge and information; conflicts and bargaining between the parties will most
likely solved by using the voice option instead of exit (Hirshman).
As Simon points out
Markets represent only a part, if an important part, of the channels of
communication and coordination between organizations (Mattioli Lectures,
forthcoming).
The moral of this part of the story is that the transfer of knowledge and competence is a
fundamental aspect of coordination which takes place not only within organizations but also
among organizations on markets.
Even if we believe that to try to shed light on the properties of division of labour and
coordination, and on their co-evolution can add some useful clarification to the matter, to
model this kind of process is far from our capacities and intentions. More modestly we intend
to pick up some of the properties discussed above, and try to compare the performances of
different coordination forms which arise from the division of knowledge and labour in a
context of boundedly rational behaviour. In the next two sections the relevant assumptions
will be formally discussed.
Division of Labour and Returns to Scale.
A fundamental question which has been already hinted at is whether and under which
conditions sub-problem decomposition - that we suggest as a useful representation of the
process of division of labour - can generate more efficient form of organization of production.
This question can be answered in many different ways: one of first analyses was provided by
Simon (1962) with his parable of the two watchmakers, called Tempus and Hora. Watches are
complex objects made up of a very large number of small pieces, Tempus just assembles his
watches sequentially and every time he is disturbed - for instance by his clients' phone calls -
he has to start the assembly all over again. Hora instead proceeds by first assembling subunits
of only a few components and then putting them together, every time he makes mistakes or is
disturbed by external events he will have to start again assembling only the current subunit.
His average completion time for a watch will be therefore much shorter than the one of a
watchmaker who does not divide the task into subunits and has to start again from the
beginning every time he makes a mistake.
In this example there is a clear advantage in the division of labour: when a perturbation
occurs in a sequential system, it affects the whole system, when instead it occurs in a system
made up of small independent and parallel sub-units it will not propagate outside the affected
sub-unit. But if we rule out the possibility of perturbations and mistakes, this advantage
disappears and the parallel system seems rather less efficient because of its higher
coordination costs. Only if we consider the positive long-term effects that the division of6
labour might have on the individual working capability, because of learning-by-doing and
specialization, can we again find advantages of an increase of the degree of task
decomposition. Learning seems therefore a key factor in explaining the division of labour. But
how do individual learning processes coordinate in a framework in which the very definition
of tasks is an emergent property 
2? In the remaining part of the paper we will investigate this
question by means of a very simple model of division of labour and a few simulations of
different social coordination mechanisms.
2 - Division of labour in the accountants' model.
We try to elaborate on some of the points outlined in the previous section by means of a
simple model of organization, which will be then made a little richer. The model is the
accountants' model suggested by Sobel (1992) and directly addresses the problem raised by
Simon's parable of the two watchmakers.
Suppose that the problem to be solved is counting an unknown and possibly very large
number of items, for instance dollar bills, and deliver a correct answer. Each accountant is
characterized by a certain productive capacity, i.e. the number of bills he can successfully
count in a given time interval, or, alternatively, by a certain probability of making mistakes,
which we can plausibly assume to increase with the time he spends counting, because he gets
more and more tired and error-prone, and/or more and more bored and likely to have his
attention turned away from his job. In the first case the accountant cannot simply work
anything more than his productive capacity, in the second he has no given limit, but the
likelihood of him making a mistake will increase with the size of his workload. If an
accountant makes a mistake and does not realize it, he will jeopardize the result of the entire
counting process, if he is aware of the mistake he will instead be forced to start again counting
from the beginning. In all these cases - as already discussed in the introduction - splitting the
task into sub-tasks is necessary to ensure the efficacy and efficiency of the production process.
Of course the decomposition of the global task into subtasks must be technically
possible, which is usually the case only to a certain extent, in the sense that there are usually
technical indivisibilities. Our example of the counting bills problem is in this sense a very
simple one because of the total decomposability of the problem into whatever subtasks of
whatever dimension, limited only by its integer size (i.e. the minimum subtask is counting one
bill and no less).
Suppose that the global task is to count a stack of N bills of one dollar. Suppose also
that each accountant can successfully count at most k bills in a given time interval, at the end
of which he issues a new bill whose face-value corresponds to the amount of one dollar bills
he has counted (at most k). Such bills are put in a new smaller stack and can be counted by
other accountants who will issue new higher-valued bills and so on and so forth, until a stack
of "fictitious" bills is obtained whose size is no bigger than k and can be therefore entirely
counted by one single accountant, who will be able to announce the total number.
Let us illustrate the problem with a trivial example: suppose that N=10,000 one dollar
bills is the size of the task and all accountants have a counting capacity of k=10 bills. We will
need therefore L1= 1000 accountants at the first level, who will count the 10,000 bills and
issue 1000 bills of face value $10 and put them in a new stack. To count this new stack L2=
100 accountants are needed, who will now issue 100 bills valued $ 100 and put them in a new
stack which needs L3= 10 accountants to be counted. Finally only one accountant (L4= 1) is
                                                
2 The problem of coordination of learning processes within an economic organization has been also studied, in a framework
in which the division of labour is given, in Marengo (1992).7
needed to count these 10 bills of $ 1,000 and finally announcing the result of the entire
counting process. All in all we need 1111 accountants to complete the task in 4 time units, and
we obtain a perfect pyramidal subdivision of subtasks.
More in general, if N=kn, i.e. the size of the task is an integer power of the individual
productive capacity, the optimal hierarchical structure is formed by
n = logN / log k
levels, each of them formed, respectively, by 1, k, k2, ....., kn-1 accountants.
In less special cases the ratio log N / log k is not an integer number and therefore the
number n of levels of the pyramid will be the first integer greater or equal to such ratio, this
implies that the pyramid must necessarily contain some slack resources which cannot be fully
exploited
3: let us consider a general task of size N bills, if every accountant can count up to k
bills, the lower level of the organization will produce N/k bills, the second N/k2 and so on up
to level w such as N/kw £ k. If we have exactly N/kw = k all resources in the pyramid will be
fully exploited, otherwise the productive capacity of the accountant at the top of the hierarchy
will not be entirely exploited. Moreover the numbers N/k, N/k2 .... N/kw might not be all
integer: some idle resources will therefore appear at each level for which the ratio is not an
integer number.
The ratio between size of the task N and total amount M of labour required for its
completion is given by
R(k) = N/M = kn / 1+k+k2 .... kn = (1-k)kn / 1-kn+1
thus R(k) ® 1 as n ® ¥ and the process exhibits asymptotically constant returns to
scale.
If the number N of bills to be counted increases, the organization can respond by
increasing the level of employment and/or the productive capacities k. The latter can increase
also with N constant (increase of productivity, or marxian exploitation).
3 - Division of labour and coordination.
If, as argued in the previous section, dividing complex tasks into sub-tasks to be handled
separately is usually necessary and/or more efficient than carrying it out altogether, this very
process of division of labour determines a growing and non-trivial coordination problem. The
previous section analyzed some formal properties of a toy model of division of labour and
showed under which condition a pyramidal structure can implement an optimal sub-division
of a given task. In this section we examine instead how such a structure could emerge in
different institutional set-ups and adapt to random environmental disturbances.
Generally speaking, we can imagine at least three different ways of attaining
coordination:
a) a central planner can use the model outlined in the previous section to design the
optimal organization and adapt it to changes of the size of the task and/or changes of the
                                                
3 The presence of such idle resources is a possible reason for the existence of economies of scale in this technology: a
multiplicity of tasks can in fact be internalized in one single organization, which can therefore reduce the amount of idle
resources. In the above example, two separate tasks of 5,000 $ would be more efficiently handled by a single organization
rather than separately. But this issue lies outside the scope of this paper.8
workers' capabilities. To perform this task, he or she needs to know at every moment in time
the exact values of every worker's productive capacity and the size of the global task 
4.
b) a boundedly rational central coordinator, instead of attempting an exhaustive plan,
can adaptively adjust the organizational structure by moving workers where needed. Such a
coordinator can operate as a sort of Walrasian auctioneer: he or she receives messages on all
the flows between the different levels of the organization and on unused resources and moves
workers in such a way as to fill the gaps between demand and supply between adjacent levels
of the hierarchy.
The information requirements of this boundedly rational coordinator are quite different
from a fully rational central planner's: while the latter needs precise information about the size
of the overall task and the characteristics of each accountant, the former needs information on
all the flows between different hierarchical levels. It must be also pointed out that whereas the
central planner needs precise information - as even small amounts of noise will make the
entire organization ineffective - the boundedly rational coordinator will generally only need
some signals (even qualitative ones) on supply-demand disequilibria. Moreover this
boundedly rational coordinator can be also fully replaced by inter-level coordinators which
take care only of the demand-supply equality at one interface between levels regardless what
happens in other parts of the organization.
As to the kind of cognitive capabilities which are required by the two different kinds of
decisions which the central planner and the boundedly rational coordinator have to take, the
former has to develop a highly abstract and general decision rule. This involves that the
problem has been understood in its general features and decomposed into sub-problems. The
boundedly rational coordinator on the contrary can adaptively implement the organizational
structure, with a process of trial and error which can proceed without a general understanding
of the problem (cfr. Dosi and Egidi (1991), Dosi et al. (1994)).
But the process of adaptive coordination involves a cost, given by the loss of efficiency
incurred during the very process of adaptation. While in fact the perfectly rational central
planner computes the optimal organization in his mind, the central coordinator carries out the
design process in real time and corrects mistakes only after experiencing the loss of efficiency
they cause.
On the other hand if the central planner makes mistakes, these are likely to damage
more persistently the organization, because the latter is unable to process signals which detect
the presence of inefficiencies and adjust consequently, and thourough re-design is always
needed even to cope with small perturbations.
c) coordination can be achieved also with a completely decentralized mechanisms, a
quasi-market in which each accountant adjusts his production and/or his position according to
quantity and/or price signals which are independently processed by each individual. Each
interface between levels of the organization constitutes a market where the accountants of the
lower level sell the "fictitious" bills they produce and the accountants of the higher level buy
them. Demand and supply in each of these markets depend on the number and productive
capacity of the accountants at the two levels. Suppose, for instance, that the overall productive
capacity at the lower level is not sufficient to supply the accountants at the higher level with
enough bills, some of them will not be able to produce enough because of insufficient input
level and will therefore tend to move to other parts of the organization. These adjustments
could take place simply through simple quantity signal or through a more complex price
                                                
4 This requirement seems rather paradoxical. Indeed if the planner knew exactly the amount of bills to be counted there
would be actually no need to carry out the counting process. Although less strikingly, this paradox arises also in less
caricatural production processes. Fully centralized and exhaustive planning would require perfect knowledge of every aspect
of the production process: only in this case could the coordination problem be solved in the planner's mind without the need
of local adjustments.9
mechanisms of Marshallian type (for instance: excess demand generates a price increase
which raises the profits of sellers, this attracts new sellers who make the supply increase and
balance the initial excess demand).
A decentralized coordination mechanism of this kind requires only local information
processing: each accountant can autonomously process disequilibrium signals according
solely to his own local information (knowledge about his own characteristics) and without any
need of directly knowing other accountants' characteristics. On the other hand such a
mechanism requires a strong system of incentives: the search, by all the agents, for maximum
profits. Finally, as in the case of a central coordinator, also decentralized coordination takes
place through costly adjustments in real time.
To summarize, in case a) all the decision-making capability is concentrated in the
central planner's mind, who has developed a highly context-independent coordinating rule (n
= logN / logk). The accountants in the organization do not even have the possibility to send to
the central planner signal of inter-level disequilibria. In case b), on the contrary, the central
coordinator follows a behavioural routine based on disequilibrium signals sent by the
accountants
In the next section of the paper we will study, by means of a simulation model, how
coordination could emerge as an adaptive property in the different environments defined by
centralized and decentralized coordination mechanisms and explore some of their properties.
4 - Division of labour and the emergence of coordination: a simulation model.
In the present section some of the properties of the coordination modes outlined in the
previous section will be further investigated by means of a simulation model of adaptive
learning based on Genetic Algorithms and Classifiers Systems (cf. Holland 1975 and 1986,
Goldberg 1989, Holland et al. 1986).
Let us consider a population of h accountants. Each of them is characterized by two
variables: his position in the hierarchy (i.e. the integer number which identifies the
hierarchical level where the agent is placed) and his productive capacity (i.e. the maximum
number of banknotes he can count in a given time interval). Both variables can be encoded by
their binary representations: in our examples we have used a six-bits string to represent each
accountant: the first three bits for his position in the hierarchy (levels 0 to 7) and three bits for
his counting capacity (from 0 to 7 banknotes for unit of time). The i-th accountant is
represented by the string:
Ai:   p1p2p3k1k2k3     p,k Î {0,1}
a set of h of such strings provides therefore, at each moment in time, a complete
representation of the organization whereby the position in the hierarchy (level) and the task of
each individual (productive capacity) are specified.
Accountants can both move (or be moved) across hierarchical levels and modify their
productive capacity according to signals of input-output disequilibrium either at the individual
(in the case of decentralized coordination) or at the inter-level interface (in the case of a
boundedly rational central coordinator). Such signals, appropriately interpreted, constitute the
condition part of the adaptively learning system.
1) case of the boundedly rational coordinator: the boundedly rational central coordinator
is able to adapt the entire organization according to signals of disequilibrium/equilibrium at
the interface between different levels of the hierarchy. He can be thus represented by a set of10
condition-action rules where the condition classifies such signals and the action defines a
complete organizational structure. More in details we have:
-.environmental messages (equilibrium/disequilibrium signals) are given by the
catenation of 8 binary strings (one for each inter-level interface, including the interface
between the last level and the "final demand"). Each one of these 8 sub-strings is composed
by 2 digits:
s1s2     s Î {0,1}
where the first digit is set to 1 when there exists an excess supply at that interface and is
set to 0 otherwise; the second digit is set to 1 when there exists an excess demand at that
interface and is set to 0 otherwise.
- conditions are therefore strings of the same length (16 bits) as the environmental
message which they classify:
c11c12c21c22   c81c82       c Î {0,1,#}
- action parts are binary strings of length 6h which, as already mentioned, define a
whole organizationally structure:
p11p12p13k11k12k13  ph1ph2ph3kh1kh2kh3      p,k Î {0,1}
An adaptive and boundedly rational central coordination can be in this way represented
by a classifiers system. Here we just briefly remind its basic features (more details can be
found, for instance, in Holland 1986, Holland et al. 1986, Goldberg 1989)
The adaptively learning system, which in our case is a model of a boundedly rational
central coordinator, is a system of condition-action rules such those so far described. In
addition, each rule is attributed a strength coeffcient - which, as a first approximation,
measures how successfull that rule has been in the past - and a specificity coefficient (the
number of bits in in the condition part which are different from the wild card #) - which
measures the strictness of the condition, meaning that the smaller is the cardinality of the set
of environmental messages which satisfy that condition, the higher is its specificity (the
highest specificity belonging to rules whose condition are satisfied by only one environmental
message).
This set of rules is processed along the following cycle throughout the simulation
process:
I Condition matching: a message is received from the environment which informs the
system about the disequilibrium/equilibrium conditions at the inter-level interface. Such
message is compared with the condition of all the rules and the rules which are matched, i.e.
those which apply to such a state of the world enter the following step.
II Competition among matched rules: all the rules whose condition is satisfied compete
in order to designate the one which is allowed to execute its action, i.e. to implement the
organizational structure specified by its action part. To enter this competition each rule makes
a bid based on its strength and on its specificity. In other words, the bid of each matched rule
is proportional to its past usefulness (strength) and its relevance to the present situation
(specificity):
Bid(Rj,t) = k1(k2 + k3Specificity(Rj)) Strength(Rj,t)11
Where k1,k2 and k3 are constant coefficients.
The winning rule is chosen randomly, with probabilities proportional to such bids.
III Action and strength updating: the winning rule executes the action indicated by its
action part and has its own strength reduced by the amount of the bid and increased by the
payoff that the action receives, given the occurrence of the "real" state of the world. If the j-th
rule is the winner of the competition, we have:
Strength(Rj,t+1) = Strength(Rj,t) + Payoff(t) - Bid(Rj,t)
IV Generation of new rules: the system must be able not only to select the most
successful rules, but also to discover new ones. This is ensured by applying "genetic
operators" which, by recombining and mutating elements of the already existing and most
successful rules, introduce new ones which could improve the performance of the system. In
this way new rules are constantly injected into the system and scope for new opportunities is
always made available. Genetic operators in our simulations - as in standard classifiers
systems - are crossover and mutation.
2) case of the decentralized coordination: in this case each accountant can automously
move across the hierarchical levels of the organization and change its own productive capacity
according to individual signals of disequilibrium. Some kind of market mechanism is thus
necessary to generate such local signals which reflect global disequilibria. One of the simplest
ways in which such a quasi-market could operate 
5 is by delivering quantity signals through
rationing: if at an interface between levels there is an excess demand, some (possibly all) of
the accountants of the higher level will not be able to get all the bank-notes they would like to
and will be subject to rationing on the demand side. If instead there is excess supply, some
(possibly all) of the accountants of the lower level will not be able to sell all the bank-notes
they would like to and will be subject to rationing on the supply side.
Thus, in this case, each accountant is an independent decision-maker which can be
modelled by an autonomous classifier system, and the links between the different classifier
systems are given by such rationing signals. Each accountant is thus represented by a set of
condition-action rules where the condition classifies such signals and the action defines his
own position/capacity pair. More in details we have:
- environmental messages (equilibrium/disequilibrium signals) are in general different
for each accountant and given by a two-digit binary string:
s1s2     s Î {0,1}
where the first digit is set to 1 when the accountant has been rationed on the demand
side (i.e. there exist an excess demand at the interface between that accountant's level and the
lower one) and is set to 0 otherwise; the second digit is set to 1 when the accountant has been
rationed on the supply side (i.e. there exist an excess supply at the interface between that
accountant's level and the higher one) and is set to 0 otherwise.
- conditions are therefore strings of length 2 bits which classify such environmental
messages:
c1c2       c Î {0,1,#}
                                                
5 Markets with prices are much more complex and to model them correctly we should introduce a series of hypotheses on
individual utility functions, which would take us quite far from the core issue of the paper.12
- action parts are binary strings of length 6 which define the accountant's position in the
hierarchy and his productive capacity:
p1p2p3k1k2k3      p,k Î {0,1}
Each one classifier system of this type is then processed exactly through the execution
cycle already described for the centralized coordination case.
The two coordination systems have been tested in a simple problem: the task is to count
25 bills, there are 6 accountants, whose capacity can vary between 0 and 7 banknotes and
whose position in the hierarchy can vary from level 0 to level 7. Level 0 is a stand-by
position: accountants in this position do not enter the production process 
6. Let us examine
more in details the nature of the environmental signals which characterize the two institutional
set ups:
1) in the case of the boundedly rational central coordinator, the winning rule's action
part is decoded in order to obtain the corresponding organizational design. The productive
capacity of all the accountants which are placed at the hierarchical level one is then summed
up, in order to obtain the total demand of bank-notes at this level. If such total demand is
smaller than 25, the environmental message will signal, in the following iteration, an excess
supply (the first digit will be set to 1 and the second to 0) If, on the contrary, the total demand
is bigger than 25, the environmental message will signal an excess demand (the first digit will
be set to 0 and the second to 1). Only if the total demand is equal to 25 will the environmental
message signal an equilibrium situation (both digits set to 0). The total supply of level 1 can
now be computed in this way:
- if the total demand is smaller or equal to 25, all accountants of level 1 will be able to
fully exploit their own productive capacity and thus the total supply will be given by a number
of notes equal to the number of accountants, and each of them will have a face-value equal to
the productive capacity of the accountant who produced it;
- if instead the total demand is bigger than 25, some accountants (randomly chosen) will
be unable to fully use their own productive capacity. Total supply will be given by a number
of bank-notes equal to the number of accountants of the first level who received at least one
bank-note and the face-value of each of them will be given by the amount of used productive
capacity of the accountant who produced it.
Once the total supply at the interface between levels 1 and 2 has been so computed, we
can determine the total demand as, again, the sum of the productive capacities of all the
accountants who are placed at level 2 of the hierarchy. We can then set the third and fourth
digits of the environmental message according to the disequilibrium/equilibrium situations
which are thus realized. The same procedure can be repeated for all the organizational level.
At the last level we will suppose the existence of a "final" demand of one bank-note of face
value 25. If more bank-notes are offered, an excess supply will be signalled and the face-value
of the only purchased bank-note will determine the overall payoff to the organization: if such
value is equal to 25 the organization (i.e. the winning rule) will receive a positive payoff,
otherwise it will receive a negative payoff proportional to the absolute difference between 25
and the face-value itself.
2) in the case of decentralized coordination inter-level supplies and demands are
computed in exactly the same way, but environmental messages are separately determined for
each accountant, by means of a random rationing, as explained above. If, for instance, a given
interface between level demand is higher than supply, supplied bank-notes are assigned, one
                                                
6 The possibility of exiting the organization must be necessarily allowed if we want the system to be able to adjust optimally
also when more accountants exist than the optimum number.13
by one, to a randomly chosen accountant who has still some unused productive capacity. All
accountants on the supply-side will therefore have sold all the bank-notes they produced, and
at the following iteration will receive a message whose second digit is set to 0. As to the
accountants on the demand side, some (possibly none) of them will have been given all the
bank-notes they required and at the following iteration will receive a message whose first digit
is set to 0, the others (possibly all of them) will find themselves with at least a part of their
demand unmet and at the following iteration will receive a message whose second digit is set
to 1. The organizational payoff is in this case distributed to all the accountants' winning rules
through a bucket-brigade mechanism (cf. Holland 1986).
Simulations have been carried out in order to test the adaptive performance of the
systems in different environmental conditions. Let us briefly examine the main results.
1 - A first set of results concerns the simplest situation of an error-free and stationary
world. The stack of bank-notes to be counted contains always 25 notes and no mistakes can
happen in the counting process, i.e. the counting can always be performed without any
disturbance and the face-value of the output always equals the amount of used productive
capacity. In this situation the centralized coordination mechanism is considerably more
efficient in finding the optimal structure as far as both the speed of convergence to an
effective organizational design and its stability are concerned.
It must be pointed out that the structure of the payoff function plays a crucial role in
determining the speed of convergence and the type of organization which emerges. In
particular, punishments for unused productive capacities are essential for reducing slack
resources, and a payoff function decreasing in the total task-completion time is necessary to
obtain an equal distribution of capacities across agents.
2 - In error-prone environments instead accountants can make mistakes. Two different
kinds of mistakes are possible. In the first case accountants are aware of the mistakes they
make and correct them by re-starting the counting process: random disturbances can happen
during each accountant's counting task and force him to start his counting process all over
again. In this case the payoff function contains a penalty for the time (steps of the counting
process) taken to perform the overall task. A second type of mistake is instead represented by
a random variable (with mean 0) which may cause a deviation between the amount of
productive capacity used by an accountant and the face-value of the bank-note he produces. In
this case accountants are not aware of the mistakes they make and deliver a result which is not
correct.
In both cases the decentralized mechanism is more efficient: local adjustments seem
therefore to increase the efficiency at coping with local disturbances.
5 - Conclusions and directions for further research.
So far we have pointed out that the division of labour determines a hierarchical structure
of tasks of pyramidal form. Does this structure directly relate to power relations within
organizations, i.e. is the hierarchical system of tasks division connected to the hierarchical
system of power and control? The answer is, generally speaking, no. The pyramidal structure
of our example emerges only from functional relations (each agent has to use a multiplicity of
inputs coming from different agents) and is independent of control and power relations. But,
on the other hand, the very shape of the pyramid can have some important consequences on
the relationship between agents. The number of agents in fact decreaeses as we climb the
hierarchy and thus, if the relations between to adjacent levels are managed by a market, such a14
market cannot be a competitive one because of its strong asymmetry. Market power will be
higher for agents placed in higher hierarchical positions.
In our simple model we have supposed that movements of workers across hierarchical
levels can take place instantaneously and at no cost: this is clearly a mostly unrealistic
hypothesis. Different positions in the hierarchy require different capabilities and knowledge of
different routines. There is likely to be a trade-off in the organization between the time a
worker takes to learn the routines connected to a different hierarchical level and the increase
of production time and number of mistakes due to increase of individual work loads.
Moreover in real organizations also the type of knowledge required at different
hierarchical is normally quite different: higher levels in the hierarchy involve a broader but
less precise kind of knowledge (regardless the actual intellectual capabilities of workers). The
division of labour usually involves a strong cognitive asymmetry between different levels of
tasks as a part of the general decomposition of knowledge: this element does not appear in our
accountants' model.
Finally, real economic organizations always possess some mechanism of control,
whose task is to spot elements which do not work properly either because of real problems or
because of opportunistic behaviour and a parallel and connected system of incentives which
tries to avoid the appearance of such problems.
All this elements should be embodied in our model (which could become a sort of
"beehive" rather than accountants' model) to make it more realistic.15
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